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The school of Epicureanism promotes a philosophy based on hedonism, arguing that 
pleasantness constitutes goodness. Thus the goal of life is to pursue pleasure. For the 
Epicureans, the highest pleasure is simply the total absence of pain, and nothing more. 
Mental pains are much more powerful than physical ones, so the best way to maximize 
pleasure is to abandon mental pains. Traditional interpretation of Epicurean text says that 
the primary mental pain that burdens human pleasure is fear, especially the fear of death. 
Further, humans can eliminate their fear completely by evaluating it with rational discourse. I 
argue, however, against this traditional interpretation. I interpret the Epicurean texts to hold 
that fear cannot be eliminated completely: based on Epicurean texts, fear results when basic 
needs such as food, water, and shelter become threatened.
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The Epicureans are typically understood to hold the belief that people can free themselves 
of fear through the use of reason1. I argue against this: according to Epicurean text, even the 
wisest Epicurean is vulnerable to fear in threatening environments. I will first summarize briefly 
the main structure of my argument. 
My argument will have three premises and one conclusion that logically follows. Each 
premise is simply a belief that I attribute to Epicureans, which I take to be uncontroversial. 
Taken together they result in a belief that is more controversial, which I argue should be 
attributed to the Epicurean doctrine of beliefs in order to maintain logical coherence. The first 
premise is that people must live with what Epicureans call “natural and necessary” desire; 
second is that threat to such natural and necessary desire results in fear; and third is that certain 
external circumstances can present threats to natural and necessary desire. It follows from these 
premises that fear can detract from the tranquil state of even the perfectly trained Epicurean in 
certain circumstances. 
Emily Austin comes to this same conclusion in her paper “The Politics of Fearing Death”. 
However, she and I disagree on one key aspect: Austin argues on behalf of the Epicureans that 
humans cannot let go of certain desires because of their natural and necessary aversion to death. 
On the other hand, I argue that Epicureans see natural and necessary desires as rooted in an 
aversion to pain according to their texts. I defend my claim that Epicureans are not averse 
to death in itself, and that they are averse to pain in itself. Then I address Austin’s primary 
objection to my argument. 
To explain each premise a bit further, the first premise is that there are some desires—
those that the Epicureans consider “natural and necessary”—that every person must strive to 
fulfill. This just means that people necessarily desire the basic materials they need to survive, 
like food, water, and shelter. Necessary desires are the exception to the Epicurean philosophy 
that desiring things should be avoided in general. They hold that unfulfilled desire is the source 
of all pain2, so to minimize unfulfilled desire (and therefore pain), one should minimize desire 
altogether. The Epicureans are hedonists, so avoidance of pain is the core foundation of their 
philosophy. My first premise states that one cannot rid themselves of natural and necessary 
desires, and thus they must strive to fulfill them. The following examples from Epicurean texts 
support this first premise of my argument. 
First the Principle Doctrine (PD) 293 reads, “Of our desires some are natural and 
necessary, others are natural but not necessary; and others are neither natural nor necessary, 
but are due to groundless opinion.” Further, the Letter to Menoeceus lists the following reasons 
why some desires are necessary: “Some are necessary for happiness, some for the freedom of 
disturbance of the body, and some for life itself” (p. 127-8). Basic needs are necessary for all 
three of these things. To desire these things is an essential, instinctual part of any person, such 
that one believes the desire must be fulfilled. 
The second premise of my argument is that the prospect of not fulfilling this type of desire 
results in fear. I define fear as unpleasant thoughts caused by the anticipation of unpleasant 
things to come4. It is impossible to reason oneself out of this kind of fear. Arguably, there are 
two potential ways to reason oneself out of fear in general: 
(1) Realize that the anticipated thing causing fear is not actually unpleasant. In this case 
there is nothing unpleasant to fuel the unpleasant thoughts. However, this type of reasoning 
does not work on unfulfilled desire, as it is the sole cause of pain for Epicureans, as reported 
above, and therefore necessarily unpleasant.
(2) Realize that fear does not help one to avoid or prevent the unpleasant thing from 
occurring. In this case it is not reasonable to have fear, since it makes the situation more 
unpleasant, and the wise Epicurean could train herself to stop having the unpleasant thoughts. 
However, this is not the case with regard to basic needs because fear is functional—it helps the 
Epicurean (or any person, for that matter) to fulfill her needs in difficult situations. 
I would like to defend this point further, that fear is advantageous for survival. Humans 
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are equipped with biological mechanisms to help us fulfill essential desires, but they often 
require an element of fear to motivate one to act. Take the case of someone not having drinkable 
water, for instance; fear induced by natural and necessary desire for water would likely lead 
them to find a solution. In most cases, fear will subside after the natural and necessary desire is 
satisfied, and it enables one to go on to experience pleasure that more than outweighs the mental 
unpleasantness that it caused. While fear may not always succeed in allowing one to avoid 
danger, the rational agent will still accept the risk since it will most likely succeed.  
The advantages of fulfilling natural and necessary desire—future opportunities to attain 
and enjoy the mindset of a sage—are very likely to outweigh the unpleasantness incurred from 
fear of not having basic needs met. So even the most rational Epicurean will fear the prospect 
of failing to meet basic needs if she thinks it is likely to happen. 
Traditional interpretation that fear can be fully eliminated with reasoning relies on the 
fact that natural and necessary desires are usually very easy to fulfill (PD 26). In the case that they 
are, there is nothing unpleasant to realistically anticipate. But there are certain circumstances in 
which they are not, which brings me to my final premise. 
My third premise is that practically speaking, it is possible for the Epicurean to get 
caught in a dangerous situation. Based on the last premise, the Epicurean would anticipate the 
unpleasantness of her unsatisfied natural and necessary desire. 
So if we accept these three premises—that Epicureans cannot rid themselves of natural 
and necessary desire; that threat to natural and necessary desire results in fear; and that certain 
external circumstances can present threats to natural and necessary desire—it logically follows 
that fear can affect even the perfectly-trained Epicurean in certain circumstances. The Epicurean 
sage does not eliminate fear from her life completely, and this is intentional. This is partly 
because fear is good to have since it is advantageous for survival when one is in danger. 
This conclusion differs from traditional interpretations of Epicurean texts, which claim 
that fear is based on false beliefs, and so one can eliminate fear with proper reasoning regardless 
of circumstance. If the sage wants to rid herself of fear completely, she needs to live in a secure 
environment, hence why the Epicureans encourage people to live in small communities of 
friends and refrain from engaging in politics (PD 14). But the trouble is that this last caveat is 
not typically added as a necessary part of the Epicurean doctrine. We should therefore report 
the Epicureans as offering a method for developing a tranquil mindset, adding the qualification: 
only in circumstances where basic needs are sure to be met. 
Emily Austin comes to an almost identical conclusion—the sage is vulnerable to fear in 
unstable environments, but that one can compensate for it by living in a peaceful community. 
However, Austin and I disagree about the motivation behind this fear. She argues that Epicureans 
concern themselves with natural and necessary desire because they want to avoid death (Austin, 
p. 121-27). But I argue that they want to avoid pain, and that the rational Epicurean does not fear 
death in itself. To fear “death in itself” is to fear only the “dying” aspect of death, independent 
from the painful experience or social consequences that may accompany death. I will first return 
briefly to an earlier point—that an aversion to pain motivates fulfillment of basic desires, and 
then address a major objection from Austin: the Epicurean’s apparent aversion to painless death.
As said above, aversion to pain is the foundation for all Epicurean philosophy; they 
identify as hedonists, for whom pleasure is the ultimate good for which all things are valuable 
and pain detracts from value in the same way. This alone provides sufficient evidence to 
conclude that Epicureans avoid dangerous situations, at least in part, for the sake of avoiding a 
painful experience. So fear that results from dangerous situations is caused by the Epicurean’s 
aversion to pain. 
In order to argue that it is actually an aversion to death that instigates fear, Austin presents 
examples of certain behaviors of Epicureans and attributes them to an aversion to death (Austin, 
p.121-27). One of her main arguments is that Epicureans would avoid death, even if it were 
painless. I will counter this argument by explaining why the sage would avoid painless death, 
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even though she is not averse to death in itself. 
I concede that Epicureans would avoid painless death. As Austin points out, Epicureans 
are not indifferent to someone going around and killing everyone painlessly, and they would 
choose to leave town if a tyrant were coming to mass-murder them painlessly in their sleep 
(Austin, p.122). So what can account for this behavior if not an aversion to death itself? 
My response: the aversion that an Epicurean displays towards death can be explained by 
a natural, but not necessary, desire to continue living. The tranquil Epicurean sage enjoys life 
and desires to continue living. Even so, there are multiple Epicurean texts that suggest that the 
desire to live after one has attained sagehood is not actually necessary. I offer examples below 
that indicate the sage would enjoy life, but she would not be averse to the prospect of losing it. 
If my argument holds, the pleasure of life is enough motivation for her to actively avoid painless 
deaths without thinking of them as unpleasant affairs. 
The texts that support this include the Letter to Menoeceus (Epicurus, Inwood, Gerson 
4.126):
 “But the wise man neither rejects life nor fears death. For living does not offend him, 
nor does he believe not living to be something bad. And just as he does not unconditionally 
choose the largest amount of food but the most pleasant food, so he savours not the longest time 
but the most pleasant.”
We see that for Epicurus, quantity of life does not matter, and he would willingly sacrifice 
quantity for quality in general. 
 Other supporting texts are Principle Doctrines 18, 19, and 20. They collectively teach 
that a long span of time will provide an equal amount of pleasure as will a short span for a sage. 
The Epicurean sage might have less variation of pleasure by dying shortly after achieving a 
tranquil mindset, but she would not be deprived of any amount of pleasure.
Lucretius also supports this claim in On the Nature of Things:
“If your past life has been a boon, and if not all your blessings have flowed straight 
through you and run to waste like water poured into a riddled vessel, why, you fool, do you 
not retire from the feast of life like a satisfied guest and with equanimity resign yourself to 
undisturbed rest? If, however, all your enjoyments have been poured away and lost, and if life is 
a thorn, why do you seek to prolong your existence, when the future, just as surely as the past, 
would be ruined and utterly wasted? Why not rather put an end to life and trouble?” (p. 92-3).  
Indeed, Lucretius seems to say at the beginning of this quote that if one is satisfied with 
life, one should “quit while he is ahead”, and end it at a point when one is filled with pleasure 
before anything bad happens. He then goes on to advise the reader to end one’s life if it is not 
going so well, for the future undoubtedly holds the same miseries for that person. Lucretius’s 
advice seems to reveal a thorough indifference to a continued life in itself. 
 Finally, Philodemus’s On Death also helps this argument. According to Tsouna’s The 
Ethics of Philodemus,
“His treatment of that fear is grounded on the theses that if one understands the limits of 
pleasure, a small amount of time naturally suffices in order to produce it (De mort. III. 33–6), 
and that the flesh very quickly achieves as much pleasure as can be provided by an infinite time 
(III. 37–9)” (p. 256).
It seems clear from these texts that the continuation of life is a natural but unnecessary 
desire for the Epicurean sage; she does not fear threats to her life, but she does fear threats to her 
state of pleasure. She enjoys life, but prioritizes pleasure over all things, including life. 
 So the prospect of ending one’s life does not bring about unpleasant thoughts for the 
Epicurean, though she does enjoy life while it lasts. Such pleasures are objects of natural and 
unnecessary desire in the texts5. In other words, if the sage’s desire to live is encroaching on her 
pleasant mindset, she will gladly relinquish the desire completely, as long life presents no actual 
benefit for the Epicurean beyond sagehood6.
So the sage does not see painless deaths as harmful but he still has a motivation to avoid 
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them for the sake of pleasure experienced in life. Therefore Austin’s primary objection fails to 
prove that death is the motivating factor in fulfilling desire. 
To conclude, Austin and I agree that Epicureans are vulnerable to fear when they come 
into dangerous circumstances that threaten their basic needs. But this fear results from an 
aversion to pain, as Epicureans do not see death as harmful. 
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Notes
1 For instance James Warren argues for the interpretation that the fear of death is irrational, and it can 
be eradicated by engaging in rational discourse and altering one’s false value judgments (page 7-8). 
2 Principle Doctrines 21 and 26 advocate reducing one’s desire as a primary method of avoiding pain; 
Text 141 in the Inwood and Gerson translation provides further support, discussing emotional pain 
from unpleasant thoughts, which also arises from unfulfilled desire. 
3 References to Principle Doctrines and Letter to Menoeceus are taken from Inwood and Gerson 
translation.
4 One could argue that fear so defined is an anachronism that matches modern conceptions of fear 
more closely than ancient conceptions. More research into how closely this definition matches the 
Epicurean experience would strengthen my argument, but for the moment I offer an explicit definition 
so the reader may judge my argument in so far as they agree or disagree with it. Thanks to Dr. Daniel 
Moore at the University of Tennessee for this comment. 
5 See Principle Doctrines 26 and 30; Vatican Sentence 21 for guidelines on dealing with unnecessary 
desires.
6 Naomi Rinehold’s paper for the course on Epicureanism at University of Tennessee offers further 
discussion on this topic.
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